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Ecosystem services have been identified as a central link 
between society, or human systems, and the structure and 
function of natural systems (e.g., U.S. LTER 2007, MEA 
2005).  A  fundamental  economic  problem  is  that  while 
almost everyone—environmental groups, policy makers, 
and broad segments of the general public—seems to be-
lieve ecosystem services are valuable, the available public 
policy tools and approaches for private action fall short, 
and often omit, a direct link to the real values of the peo-
ple. If ecosystem services are of economic value, then a 
fundamental challenge concerns how to identify the link 
between ecosystem services and the quality of life of indi-
vidual households, and how to use that link to integrate 
ecosystem service values into the decisions of businesses and 
individuals in society. Given current markets and policies 
decision–makers are unable to recognize the full value of 
services ecosystems provide. What can be done to integrate 
ecosystem service values into the economy? After reviewing 
a fundamental cause for why markets often overlook eco-
system services, and after considering some limitations of 
the often effective approaches of philanthropy and govern-
ment, we consider the potential to leverage experimental 
economics to create and test approaches to integrate values 
at the individual level into markets addressing ecosystem 
services. 
A Fundamental Problem
One  daunting  frontier  for  ecosystem  services  originates 
from the natural character of many services, which sharply 
restricts or prevents the ability of providers to capture a 
return from many, often most, beneficiaries. This is the na-
ture of “public goods” and “fugitive resources.” Both involve 
“nonexclusivity”:  providers  cannot  exclude  beneficiaries 
from benefit without payment for the cost of provision. For 
public goods, many people may benefit simultaneously, so 
no one provider (or user–beneficiary) can exclude anyone 
else at any particular moment. An owner of undeveloped 
farm, forest or lake shore often cannot insist on payment 
from the sprawling, urban–fringe residents who value open 
space for aesthetic tranquility; therefore, the landowner has 
little incentive to consider his community’s open space val-
ues in choices about current use of his land. For fugitive 
resources, Nature does not allow a provider to contain and 
control the resource she has provided or protected; rivers 
flow and wildlife migrate across boundaries. A farmer or 
lawn–owner whose fertilizer percolates to the Mississippi 
or Potomac cannot insist on a return from the fishermen 
who would gain from a smaller Gulf Coast dead–zone, or 
from the patrons of oyster bars who seek a Chesapeake 
culture of local shellfish. Moreover, the opportunity for 
every beneficiary to benefit without payment creates the 
incentive to “free ride” or hang back and wait for potential 
providers—or public–spirited philanthropists—to “do the 
right thing” at their own expense, despite their own oppor-
tunity to ride free on others’ generosity.
As a result, the could–be bounty of ecosystem services, 
and the conditions of ecosystem structure and function, of-
ten arise as a residual, left–over after–thought of decisions 
that potential providers make to sustain their livelihoods. 
For example, even conservation–minded farmers must im-
plement practices within the annual, weather–dependent, 
schedule of their business, and society receives fish, wild-
life, open space and water quality that results (or doesn’t 
result).8  CHOICES  2nd Quarter 2008 • 23(2) 
Current Solutions
To be sure, we have institutions, pub-
lic policies and private actions under-
way  that  mitigate  the  nonexclusive 
nature of Nature’s services. But most 
existing tools remain short on their 
ability to integrate ecosystem services 
into the economy in a manner that 
is fully commensurate with familiar, 
commercially viable products. 
Government  authority  generates 
land–use and environmental regula-
tions that place enforceable limits on 
the degree to which individuals and 
firms can impose consequences on a 
broader community, such as through 
pollution  or  use  of  resources  held 
in the public trust, with impacts on 
public health or endangered species. 
Government can also implement in-
centive  payments  which  directly  or 
indirectly  compensate  providers  for 
actions to provide for ecosystem ser-
vices, such as through federally fund-
ed  conservation  reserve  or  wetland 
reserve programs. It should be noted 
that,  as  market–based  approaches, 
government incentive payments pri-
marily focus on the supply side op-
portunity costs of providers, such as 
compensating  farmers  who  forego 
crop production on land enrolled in a 
conservation reserve. Centrally–guid-
ed incentive payments may reflect po-
litically or bureaucratically attenuated 
demand–side, public values through 
a  benefit–cost  analysis,  but,  in  this 
article, we discuss the potential to in-
tegrate demand–side values through 
more complete market mechanisms.
Philanthropy,  such  as  through 
wildlife  conservation  organizations 
or land trusts, can provide comple-
mentary actions. Philanthropists can 
provide payments for ecosystem ser-
vices by, for example, compensating 
ranchers for tolerating wolves or pur-
chasing  conservation  easements  on 
undeveloped farms or forests. Philan-
thropists  can  stimulate  government 
action  by  offering  matching  funds 
for  taxpayer–approved  conservation 
bond–issues  or  providing  some  off-
sets for debts of developing countries 
that  protect  biodiversity.  Of  course 
philanthropy exists under the shadow 
of incentives for individuals to ride 
free–waiting for some other donor to 
step forward.
Clearly,  however,  the  limitations 
of government and philanthropic ac-
tion may create additional expenses 
or opportunities lost. Philanthropists 
face their dependence on good will of 
donors, and costs to fight free–riding, 
and despite the effectiveness and nim-
bleness that can come from a care-
fully focused mission, philanthropic 
approaches can generate bureaucratic 
costs. Government may be better po-
sitioned to provide a broad approach, 
perhaps  including  equity  consider-
ations, casting a wide umbrella sup-
ported by more stable (if sometimes 
controversial)  funding.  But  govern-
ment’s  costs  to  obtain  detailed  (lo-
cal–level)  information,  to  safeguard 
public integrity, and to balance po-
litical tensions, can sometimes create 
the agility and efficiency of a bull at 
Tiffany’s china shop. Both may find 
it difficult to focus their mission or 
goals in detailed alignment with the 
interests of a diverse public. 
In contrast, decentralized market 
approaches  to  provision  of  valued 
goods and services are respected for 
agility, responsiveness to diverse pref-
erences, and efficiency in directly ag-
gregating consequences of individual 
values and choices into fairly univer-
sal signals of relative scarcity (called 
relative prices). Often supported by a 
coalition of nationally or internation-
ally known, large, commercial firms 
and philanthropic organizations, we 
see  nongovernmental  organizations 
(NGOs)  developing  standards  and 
practices for certification of ecosystem 
or natural resource–based products as 
“sustainably produced” through har-
vest and process chains that are en-
vironmentally  friendly.  The  Marine 
Stewardship  Council  (MSC),  con-
cerning seafood, and the Forest Stew-
ardship  Council  (FSC),  concerning 
forest  products,  provide  two  exam-
ples, and we are witnessing a prolif-
eration of green–marketing efforts—
sometimes supported by third–party 
verification  exemplified  by  MSC  or 
FSC  eco–labeling—whereby  firms 
are recognizing a public demand for 
attention to environmental steward-
ship. While laudable, these efforts tie 
ecosystem services to the consumer’s 
choices  among  familiar  commercial 
products, rather than directly target-
ing the consumer’s value for specified 
ecosystem services. 
Approaches to ecosystem services 
based primarily on a natural–science 
perspective can overlook another sig-
nificant  challenge:  identification  of 
what people value, rather than sim-
ply what scientists currently measure. 
From  the  human  household’s  per-
spective, what is the service? Physical 
measures of ecosystem output, such 
as for water quality and quantity, may 
often be salient and intuitive for, say, 
provisioning  services  like  water  for 
drinking or irrigation purposes. But 
what  about  measures  linking  water 
quality  and  services  of  interest  for 
recreation?  Egan,  Herriges,  Kling 
and  Downing  (forthcoming)  show 
that individual households, pursuing 
a diverse set of activities, are respon-
sive to a broad suite of water quality 
measures suggested by biologists, but 
careful modeling is needed to link bi-
ological measures through the process 
by which households seek ecosystem 
services  and  therefore  value  various 
dimensions of water quality. 
Innovation Addressing Consumer 
Values
Private  NGOs,  government,  and 
academia have stimulated innovative 
work on the valuation of ecosystem 
services.  Society’s  representatives’ 
need a better understanding of what 
it  is  that  households  actually  value 
from ecosystems. We need, and are 
pursuing, better methods to measure 
value, and to link available actions to 
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and  functions  that  yield  desirable 
ecosystem  services.  Support  for  the 
social science of ecosystem services is 
critical to developing effective policies 
supporting the public welfare.
But what is substantially missing 
from the mission of economics relative 
to ecosystem services is work focused 
on integrating values directly into the 
economy,  particularly  demand–side 
values.  Market–based  approaches 
that  integrate  demand–side  values 
give the people a direct and imme-
diate voice—an economic voice—to 
indicate whether particular levels of 
or changes in ecosystem services are 
more or less valuable than particular 
levels of or changes in familiar, com-
mercially produced goods.
How  can  society  stimulate  the 
integration of demand–side values in 
policies and market–based approach-
es addressing ecosystem services? This 
integration is already done for many 
provisioning  services  of  ecosystems, 
through  long  established  markets 
for food, fiber and natural resource–
based  commodities.  How  can  we 
directly  attack  nonexcludability  and 
give beneficiaries an economic voice 
upon  which  entrepreneurs  can  cap-
ture a return from enhancement of 
ecosystem services?
Experimental  economists  are 
increasingly  investigating  mecha-
nisms  that  stimulate  individuals  to 
go beyond baseline donations and to 
transform  a  higher  portion  of  their 
values  into  revenues  in  support  of 
public  goods.  Experimental  econo-
mists  bring  human  subjects  into  a 
controlled laboratory setting to study 
how incentives and rules of exchange 
lead to individual or collective choic-
es  and  outcomes.  In  public  goods 
experiments, researchers design a set 
of monetary payoffs that individuals 
can earn through their choices, and 
these payoffs simulate the manner in 
which  individuals  benefit  from  real 
public goods. For example, working 
agricultural ecosystems might give ru-
ral residents aesthetic pleasure when 
farms provide grassland habitats for 
songbirds; every member of the com-
munity receives a “songbird benefit” 
whenever  the  habitat  is  provided, 
regardless of who bore the costs. In 
the laboratory, a group of individuals 
may be asked to pay for provision of 
a group–fund that provides a mon-
etary return to everyone in the group, 
including those members who chose 
not to invest. Since the group–fund 
does  not  exclude  noncontributors 
from benefiting, it comprises an ab-
stract,  monetized  simulation  of  a 
public good. 
Such  experiments  have  shown 
that changing the incentives for indi-
viduals to ride free on the contribu-
tions of others can increase the degree 
to which individuals voluntarily pay 
for the cost of a public good and can 
bring  their  payments  into  a  closer 
correspondence with their own value 
for the good. While practical mecha-
nisms reduce the incentives for indi-
viduals to free–ride, additional effort 
is needed to evaluate and improve the 
degree to which mechanisms balance 
the provision of benefits net of costs. 
Since many people benefit simultane-
ously, an efficient balance of costs and 
benefits occurs when a provider deliv-
ers increments of public good until 
the costs of delivering the last unit 
are just offset by the combined total 
amount  that  all  beneficiaries  would 
willingly pay for that increment rath-
er than doing without it. 
 Since different people have differ-
ent values, some may value the public 
good more or less highly than others, 
so a combined total amount may in-
volve different people paying differ-
ent prices. This issue is not surprising; 
obviously  with  familiar  donations 
mechanisms, different people donate 
different amounts. But it means the 
nonexcludable character of some eco-
system services will require entrepre-
neurs to explain the rationale for mar-
ket mechanisms to newcomers from 
the general public. 
Real Markets for Ecosystem 
Services
The  insights  from  economics  ex-
periment  already  offer  potential  to 
support  markets  for  real  ecosystem 
services.  Through  USDA  funding, 
the  authors  have  established  an  ex-
perimental market in Jamestown, R.I. 
This example shows both promising 
results  and  significant  areas  where 
progress requires additional work to 
design and test mechanisms by which 
entrepreneurs could develop ecosys-
tem service markets.
Jamestown is widely regarded for 
supporting  conservation  of  unde-
veloped farm, forest and open space 
and is in the process of completing 
transactions  to  purchase  develop-
ment rights on the last few operating 
farms.  However,  while  setting  aside 
development rights may prevent the 
construction of additional residential 
neighborhoods  or  other  developed 
uses, it may still be challenging for 
farmers to maintain farm operations. 
Moreover, changes in the intensity of 
farming, along with rising costs for 
energy  or  other  inputs,  push  more 
ecosystem services outside the margin 
that farmers can sustain while main-
taining their business.
This applies, for example, to the 
cultural or aesthetic services provided 
by grassland wildlife to residents who 
seek to live in a rural community that 
supports  a  healthy  ecosystem.  The 
experimental market centered on sell-
ing, to Jamestown residents, an op-
portunity to protect grassland habi-
tats during the nesting season. This 
product  was  presented  as  contracts 
with  farmers  who  agreed  to  forego 
hay  harvesting  and  restrict  grazing 
on 10–acre fields during eight weeks 
from the beginning of May to the be-
ginning of July.
Using  insights  from  laboratory 
experiments, the research design al-
lowed  a  comparative  test  of  three 
market  mechanisms,  including  one 
intended  only  to  measure  potential 
value and two intended to raise rev-0  CHOICES  2nd Quarter 2008 • 23(2) 
enues sufficient to cover the costs of 
a contract. The study created an ex-
perimental  (but  nonprofit)  business 
and advertised under the trade mark 
of the Nature Services Exchange of 
Jamestown, created as a partnership 
of  the  University  of  Rhode  Island 
and EcoAsset Markets Inc., an inde-
pendent business in Providence, R.I. 
Residents were randomly assigned to 
groups. Each household in a group 
was asked to make a monetary offer 
subject to rules of the market mecha-
nism  assigned  to  that  group;  offers 
were made by personal check or by 
credit–card authorization. 
The rules for all mechanisms in-
cluded  a  “provision  point,”  which 
corresponds to the minimum amount 
of funding that a group must provide 
in order to cover the costs of a pub-
lic  good.  In  Jamestown,  the  provi-
sion point is linked to the cost of a 
contract with a farmer who agrees to 
omit any harvest of hay on a specified, 
10–acre field during the late–spring 
nesting season for Bobolinks, a grass-
land–nesting bird. Contracts were ne-
gotiated to cover the farmer’s cost to 
replace the loss of feed by foregoing a 
hay harvest and to compensate for ad-
ditional risk and management incon-
venience to manipulate herds around 
the protected field(s). However, the 
provision point is more than a simple 
fundraising goal; rather it also com-
prises an implicit (beneficent) threat 
that  a  specific,  quantified  increase 
in the services of a public good will 
not occur unless the group provides 
for its costs. Laboratory experiments 
have  shown  a  money–back–guaran-
tee reinforces the provision point and 
the tie between contributions and the 
specific service offered. The guarantee 
establishes  the  rule  that  if  funding 
falls short of the provision point, so 
the good is not provided, the fund-
raiser (seller) will not simply redirect 
revenues to other purposes. The provi-
sion point and money–back–guaran-
tee rules reduce the incentives to ride 
free because group members (should) 
realize that the responsibility lies with 
the defined group and no one outside 
the group, so there are limitations on 
the  opportunity  to  wait  for  others 
to pay. These rules were used in the 
Jamestown experimental market. 
Laboratory experiments have also 
demonstrated that rules to rebate ex-
cess  funds  to  contributors  increase 
the offers that individuals will make, 
given their values. Rebates reduce the 
free–riding incentive for individuals 
to hold–back in a strategic effort to 
offer  just–the–right–amount  rather 
than paying more than was necessary 
after the contributions of others. The 
rebate feature was varied across mech-
anisms tested in Jamestown.
Our  “pivotal  mechanism”  (PM) 
established a full rebate to any indi-
vidual  whose  offer  was  not  needed 
to meet the provision point for their 
field after all other contributions from 
their group were taken into account. 
This PM creates an incentive for each 
person to view their own contribu-
tion as if it was the last one needed, 
and their decision would make–or–
break the outcome for their group’s 
hayfield. The PM provides incentives 
for individuals to reveal their full will-
ingness to pay to protect a hayfield 
for grassland birds, but it’s advantage 
in measuring value is off–set by the 
practical limitation that very few or 
no individuals will be pivotal in most 
situations, so the PM generally fails to 
raise actual revenues.
Our  “proportional  rebate”  (PR) 
mechanism  is  one  of  two  we  de-
signed to raise revenues. Under the 
PR rules, any funds collected above 
the amount needed to cover the cost 
of a farm contract would be rebated 
to each contributor in proportion to 
their own contribution to the total of 
all  contributions  from  their  group. 
In our 2007 market, the second rev-
enue–raising mechanism used the set 
of offers from a group to calculate the 
lowest possible “uniform price” (UP) 
such that everyone who paid would 
receive a rebate of the excess of their 
offer above the UP; anyone who of-
fered to pay less than the UP would 
receive a full refund. Under the UP, 
everyone who pays will pay the same 
price (after their rebate).
The  market  generated  total  of-
fers of around $9700, across all three 
mechanisms,  with  substantial  varia-
tion  across  groups  depending  upon 
the rules by which excess funds would 
be rebated. Based on laboratory ex-
periments, we expected the PR mech-
anism  to  come  closest  to  the  “full 
value”  estimated  under  the  pivotal 
mechanism  (PM),  and  Jamestown’s 
preliminary results support this pre-
diction. While the UP approach was 
expected  to,  and  did,  elicit  lower 
offers  (and  lower  revenues)  from 
groups, in on–going research we are 
investigating the possibility that simi-
lar  mechanisms  may  produce  more 
stable  revenues  year–after–year,  as 
compared to PR. In the 2007 mar-
ket, of six hayfields available for bird 
conservation, revenues met the provi-
sion points for three. Initial analysis 
suggests, however, that for about 400 
homes participating there is potential 
value–as  revealed  under  the  various 
mechanisms– ranging from $8800 to 
$28,000 to protect a field for grass-
land  birds.  The  on–going  challenge 
will be finding better ways to align 
revenues with this potential value.
The Jamestown experience shows 
that,  even  in  the  case  of  a  cultural 
or  aesthetic  ecosystem  service,  ex-
perimental economic markets might 
prove  successful.  In  Jamestown,  all 
three of the fields that were ultimately 
protected would have been harvested 
during the 2007 nesting season had 
the farmers been unable to obtain sup-
port to offset costs to their operation. 
Moreover, other data from this study 
suggests that not only did residents 
value contracts focused on Bobolinks, 
but they may also value contracts that 
help  farmers  to  restore  previously 
idled hayfields to a state that provides 
additional habitat and also eliminates 
invasive plants that may be harmful 
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(like the monarch butterfly). The eco-
system service market may eventually 
enable farmers to expand their opera-
tions with services that Jamestown’s 
exurban residents’ value.
Concluding Observations
Developing  mechanisms  to  enable 
entrepreneurs  to  leverage  consumer 
values may substantially expand the 
potential  for  market  approaches  to 
lead to valuable impacts for ecosys-
tem services. Consider for a moment 
the  cap–and–trade  approaches  used 
for air and water pollutants, and cur-
rently  under  discussion  for  carbon 
emissions.  If  market  mechanisms 
create a closer alignment between in-
dividual and collective values and in-
centives to support the public good, 
then markets may create an avenue by 
which communities can directly influ-
ence the key choice of the overall cap 
on emissions; individuals and groups 
who value a further reduction in emis-
sions could buy and retire a quantity 
of permits in a manner that effectively 
lowers the overall cap. Markets enable 
private action that can complement 
or improve upon the government, or 
philanthropic, actions already under-
way for ecosystem services.
Here again the Jamestown Bobo-
link market provides an example. After 
seeing a summary of the experimental 
market in Audubon magazine in No-
vember 2007, a community–garden 
club in Grant, Minnesota, contacted 
the authors and developed their own 
entrepreneurial  approach  to  protect 
a hayfield next to their community 
garden. This year their club members 
have rented the hayfield in consider-
ation  of  grassland  birds,  illustrating 
that once enabled, entrepreneurship 
can  expand  to  enhance  the  provi-
sion of ecosystem services in a nimble 
fashion.
Furthermore,  research  on  the 
implementation  of  ecosystem  ser-
vice markets may benefit from inter-
disciplinary  teams  and  inclusion  of 
outreach. In Jamestown, farmers’ in-
dependent  experimentation  is  likely 
to  yield  modifications  to  contracts, 
such as to plan for early–season graz-
ing, that both enhance farmers’ abil-
ity to deliver ecosystem services and 
lower the costs (or provision points) 
implied. At this writing, Jamestown 
farmers  are  weighing  options  to  al-
ter grass species in their hayfields, to 
better  manage  joint  production  of 
grassland birds and feed for livestock 
(G. Neale, personal communication). 
Moreover, ecological research on bird 
behavior  may  enable  the  design  of 
methods  that  allow  environmental 
managers to guide birds toward fields 
that are likely to be protected in the 
next season. Such considerations may 
be critical to establishing hayfield har-
vest rotations through a series of years 
that sustain the quality of hayfields 
for both feed production and habitat. 
The field experience also has raised a 
number of questions that were not ap-
parent from a review of experimental 
economics literature alone, including 
questions  about  which  mechanisms 
would produce stable revenues over 
time  or  be  adaptable  to  situations 
where many increments to ecosystem 
services might be possible. 
The  challenge  of  ecosystem  ser-
vices is as complex as the complex-
ity of human and ecological systems 
combined. Ecosystem services link us 
with Nature and progress will often 
require  a  comprehensive  approach 
with  disciplinary,  interdisciplinary 
and integrated teams on the frontier.
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